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INTRODUCTION
The United States and other foreign parties that have business interests
in the People’s Republic of China must often decide between commercial
arbitration and filing suit in Chinese courts when disputes arise with
Chinese parties. If the parties contract to resolve their disputes at a
commercial arbitration institution in China1, they will have to understand
the practice of med-arb. Med-arb is the acronym for mediation-arbitration,
a type of dispute resolution that combines mediation (or “conciliation”2)

* J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2014; B.A., International Relations Economics, Wellesley College, 2011. The author thanks Professor Anne Kringel for her
guidance throughout the writing process. The author also thanks the members of the
University of Pennsylvania Journal Of Business Law for their editorial assistance
throughout the final stages of preparing this comment for publication.
1. This does not include Hong Kong. See infra n.71 and accompanying text
(discussing the practice of commercial arbitration in China).
2. A term that is used interchangeably with mediation in China and in this article.
Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 623 (2007).

1295

ARTICLE 6 (LIU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1296

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/29/15 1:39 PM

[Vol. 17:4

and arbitration, with the same person serving as arbitrator and mediator.
Combining these two distinct dispute resolution processes to form one
process is very controversial because, among other things, it compromises
the neutrality of the arbitral tribunal, makes uncertain the enforceability of
the arbitral award in foreign jurisdictions, and requires arbitrators to also be
effective mediators. However, the practice of med-arb is permitted and
used in China.
In recent years, “in order to achieve economic development . . .
[China] has aggressively established laws, rules and regulations that govern
arbitration and litigation.”3 However, due to continuing perceived links
between the judiciary and government, Chinese nationals and non-Chinese,
foreign investors often attempt to resolve their disagreements through
mediation if at all possible, rather than to subject themselves directly to
Chinese courts.4
Chinese law and custom encourages the amicable settlement of
disputes. This encouragement has roots in the writings of the ancient
philosopher, Confucius, who promoted the values of social harmony and
the peaceful resolution of conflict.5 During Communist Party rule,
mediation has been used as a way to settle disputes while getting the parties
to adopt the Communist Party’s values of conformity.6 As a result,
mediation is widely practiced throughout China, at the grass roots levels of
society, in foreign commercial dealings, and unsurprisingly, in arbitration.
The concept of med-arb is not unique to China, and variations of the
practice have been used in Western countries, but it is much less accepted
and much less common.7 To effectively arbitrate in China, counsel must
understand med-arb’s advantages and its disadvantages with respect to
arbitration-only proceedings. Ideally, foreign parties will realize that medarb in China is very valuable, it is not so different from what they are used
to, and that Western practices can learn from Chinese med-arb. This paper
contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the experience and
perspective of a fully financially independent commercial arbitration
institution and one of the top choices when choosing an arbitration forum
3. Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med-Arb’ and the Confluence of Culture
and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 18
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 169 (2004).
4. Id. at 152.
5. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration:
Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 479, 480 (2008).
6. Id. at 482.
7. See, e.g., Robert L. Ebe, Cooper White & Cooper LLP, Med/Arb as a Variant on
the
Usual
ADR
Process
(July
20,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cwclaw.com/publications/articleDetail.aspx?id=655. (illustrating the use of
med-arb in the United States).
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in Mainland China,8 the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC). In recent
years, med-arb has become even more attractive because progressive
Chinese local arbitration commissions like the BAC have been consciously
improving their practices and moving towards greater independence,
impartiality, and competence.
I.

THE MED-ARB PROCESS

Mediation and arbitration are the most common forms of alternative
dispute resolution for commercial disputes.9 Mediation is a voluntary
dispute resolution process and the parties in a mediation are not bound to
resolve their dispute.10 Because of their voluntary nature, mediations are
essentially negotiations that are facilitated by a mediator.11 Arbitration, on
the other hand, is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral party, the
arbitrator or the arbitration panel, hears a dispute between parties and
renders a final decision in favor of one of the parties.12 Med-arb combines
these two processes, with the arbitrator also serving as the mediator.
The Arbitration Law of China, which came into effect on September
1, 1995, and the respective Arbitration Rules of Chinese arbitration
institutions provide the legal framework for arbitration and med-arb.13 The
arbitration laws increased confidence in the finality and enforceability of
arbitration awards in the courts, causing the proliferation of local
arbitration commissions (LACs) in China.14 In his study, Fuyong Chen
notes that “any Chinese arbitration institution can arbitrate domestic and
international cases regardless of the location of the dispute or [the location
of the] parties.”15 Recently, the top LACs have been dealing with more
international commercial arbitrations than ever before because “more
foreign companies negotiating with Chinese counterparts are being
encouraged to incorporate arbitration clauses in their contracts to settle
8. Arthur Dong, Significant Changes Proposed in Beijing Arbitration Commission’s
(‘BAC’)
New
Rules
(2015),
available
at
http://www.chinalawvision.com/2014/02/articles/china-arbitration-and-arbitrat/significantchanges-proposed-in-beijing-arbitration-commissions-bac-new-rules/.
9. LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. National Arbitration FORUM, http://www.adrforum.com/faq.aspx?faq=876 (last
visited Apr. 6, 2013).
13. Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 624 (2007).
14. Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case Study
of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313, 313-14 (2007).
15. Id. at 314.
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their disputes before LACs.”16
Article 51 of the Arbitration Law of China states that “a written
conciliation statement [resulting from mediation] and an arbitration award
shall have equal legal effect.” Article 51 also provides arbitrators with a
flexible framework for deciding when and how to conduct conciliation
during arbitration:
The arbitration tribunal may carry out conciliation prior to giving
an arbitration award. The arbitration tribunal shall conduct
conciliation if both parties voluntarily seek conciliation. If
conciliation is unsuccessful, an arbitration award shall be made
promptly. If conciliation leads to a settlement agreement, the
arbitration tribunal shall make a written conciliation statement or
make an arbitration award in accordance with the result of the
settlement agreement.17
Article 39 of the Arbitration Rules of the Beijing Arbitration Commission
(“BAC”) is similar, but clarifies that conciliation may be conducted at the
arbitral tribunal’s discretion, as long as the tribunal obtains consent of both
parties:
Conciliation by the Tribunal18
(1) The Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of both parties or
upon obtaining the consent of both parties, conciliate the case in
a manner it considers appropriate. (2) If the conciliation leads to
a settlement, the parties may withdraw their claims and
counterclaims if any, or request the Arbitral Tribunal to issue a
Statement of Conciliation or make an award in accordance with
the terms of the settlement. (3) [The Statement of Conciliation]
shall be binding once both parties have acknowledged receipt of
it.19
The BAC, founded in 1995, is a leading arbitration institution and became
fully financially independent from the government early on, in 1998.20 It

16. Id.
17. Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the Ninth Meeting
of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on August 31, 1994,
promulgated by Order No.31 of the President of the Peoples Republic of China on August
31, 1994, and effective as of September 1, 1995).
18. In standard arbitration proceedings at the BAC, each party selects one member of
the arbitral tribunal, and the Chairman, based on the arbitrator’s background and expertise,
selects the lead arbitrator. Summary (or expedited) proceedings are presided by a sole
arbitrator selected by the Chairman. Article 18 and 48 of the Arbitration Rules of the BAC.
19. Arbitration Rules revised and adopted at the First Meeting of the Fifth Session of
the Beijing Arbitration Commission on September 20, 2007. Effective as of April 1, 2008.
20. GAR,
Beijing
Arbitration
Commission
(BAC),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/regional-arbitration/6/category/88/entry/566/ (last visited
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practices independent hiring for staff as well.21 In terms of caseload,22 the
BAC is comparable to the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), the most visible arbitration institution,
which was established by the China Chamber of International Commerce.23
The BAC is the main LAC referenced in this article.
In practice, conciliation procedures can commence after arbitration
has been initiated, and when the conciliation is unsuccessful, the parties
return to the arbitration procedure.24 The arbitrator may choose the
appropriate moment in the course of the proceedings to offer the tribunal’s
services for settlement purposes.25 Arbitrators conduct conciliation by
caucusing. Russell Thirgood explains that arbitrators conduct mediation in
one of the following ways: “the arbitrator consulting with both parties,
arbitrators consulting with the parties individually, the parties consulting
with each other without the arbitrators present or a combination of these
techniques.”26
A common dispute over share transfer agreements might help
illustrate the med-arb process better. A shareholder (respondent)27 alleged
that their share transfer agreements with a company (claimant)28 were void
for misrepresentation. The claimant commenced arbitration proceedings
before the BAC, claiming that the agreements were valid. After
preliminary procedures, the tribunal heard the claimant’s opening statement
and the respondent’s defense.29 The tribunal then proceeded to examine the

Apr. 26, 2015).
21. See Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case
Study of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313 (2007).
22. The BAC had 1,473 cases in 2012, 1,471 cases in 2011, and 1,566 cases in 2010.
2012 Work Summary of Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC), BEIJING ARBITRATION
COMMISSION, http://arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/2012-2013.html (last visited May 20,
2015); Speech in Tea Party of 2012 Spring Festival, BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
http://arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/2011-2012.html (last visited May 20, 2015); Speech
at the Tea Party of 2011 Spring Festival, BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
http://arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/2010-2011.html (last visited May 20, 2015).
Similarly, the CIETAC had 1,060 cases in 2012, 1,435 cases in 2011, and 1,352 cases in
2010. Statistics, CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited April 26, 2015).
23. CIETAC, Introduction, http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Apr. 26,
2015).
24. Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 625-27 (2007).
25. Id.
26. Russell Thirgood, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT’L ARB. 3,
89, 92-93 (2000).
27. Used instead of “Defendant” at the BAC.
28. Used instead of “Plaintiff” at the BAC.
29. Author’s own notes on the hearing process at the BAC (on file with the author).
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claimant’s evidence and respondent’s evidence.30 Typically, the tribunal
will make inquiries to the parties after the evidence is presented and decide
whether to attempt conciliation.31 In this case, the tribunal decided to
pursue conciliation and both the claimant and respondents consented.32
First, the tribunal spoke with both parties in a face-to-face caucus. The
tribunal proposed that the claimant make a payment of 250 million RMB to
the respondents in exchange for the agreement to be performed.33 Both
sides expressed dissatisfaction with the proposal, which meant further
back-to-back caucusing, first privately with the claimant, then with the
respondent.34 The respondent no longer wanted to conciliate. After the
unsuccessful conciliation, the arbitral tribunal resumed arbitration and gave
the parties an opportunity to debate.35 No additional evidence or a second
hearing was required.36 The tribunal deliberated and issued an arbitral
award.37
II.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MED-ARB

For those who have arbitration clauses embedded in contracts that
designate a LAC as the forum of arbitration and for those who have joint
ventures38 in China, in which case arbitration must be at a Chinese
arbitration institution as an alternative to court, understanding med-arb’s
advantages and disadvantages with respect to arbitration-only proceedings
will allow the parties and their counsel to make a more informed decision
about whether to consent to conciliation.
A.

Advantages

Advantages of med-arb in China include amicable settlement of
commercial disputes, the flexibility to tailor dispute resolution to the needs
of the parties, and more efficient outcomes. These advantages are coupled
with med-arb’s higher likelihood of enforcement in Chinese courts than

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH,
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (University Casebooks, 4th ed. 2008) (discussing the
business effects of arbitration clauses).
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that of mediation alone.39 Furthermore, the New York Convention only
recognizes the enforceability of arbitral awards and does not include
conciliation statements.40 The New York Convention, also known as the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, aids the
enforcement in domestic courts of awards granted in foreign countries.41
Most United Nations member states are parties to the convention.42 Of
course, each advantage is not without its limitations.
1.

Amicable settlement

With med-arb, parties can receive the advantages of both an
enforceable award and amicable settlement. Many practitioners and
scholars have asserted that parties from Western European and North
American cultures are often more adversarial than those from Asian
cultures.43 Because Asian cultures are assumed to value harmony to a
greater degree, stemming from Confucianism, Asian cultures are assumed
to be more suitable for med-arb.44 However, the amicable settlement medarb provides is not necessarily a significant advantage as it may be a
generalization given the globalized nature of med-arb.45 For instance,
“given the increasingly globalized nature of education and employment,
officers, directors, and general counsels of a company may have been
educated overseas and may have worked in different countries.”46
Therefore, their attitudes towards conflict and conflict resolution may
accordingly reflect their backgrounds.47 Professor Tai-Heng Chen of the
New York Law School suggests that factual investigation into the cultural
attitudes of the specific litigant and its counsel is necessary to determine if

39. See Debaditya Datta & Aonkan Ghosh, Mediation and Enforceability: Asia’s
Growing
Dilemma,
1,
4
(2011)
(unpublished
paper)
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/debaditya_datta/1 (discussing the enforcement of mediation and
arbitration clauses in Asia).
40. Id. at 14.
41. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. 1, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 7 I.L.M. 1046 (recognizing and
enforcing foreign arbitral awards).
42. See New York Convention Countries, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states (last visited
Apr. 8, 2013) (listing participants to the New York Convention).
43. See Tai-Heng Chen, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb, 34 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, 422 (Sept. 10, 2010) (noting the effects of culture on arbitration).
44. Id. at 424.
45. Id. at 425.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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med-arb will provide this advantage to the case at hand.48
2.

Flexibility

The fact that the Chinese approach to combining conciliation with
arbitration is conducted within a highly flexible framework allows
arbitration to accommodate many non-legal factors to achieve effective
resolution of the commercial dispute. Chinese law does not impose
conciliation on the arbitral tribunal at the beginning of the arbitration
proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may attempt conciliation at any time in
the proceedings before an award is made. This makes it more flexible than
arbitration-only proceedings and leaves the decision as to when to attempt a
conciliation procedure at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, in agreement
with the parties. Whether or not the arbitral tribunal decides to attempt
conciliation depends on factors such as the nature of the dispute, the areas
of expertise of the arbitrators and mediators, the cost of arbitration, how
entrenched the parties are, and business pressures to settle.49
3.

Efficiency50

Med-arb “encompasses all the benefits that usually are attributed to
settled, rather than decided, outcomes, such as [cost and time savings].”51
Should parties fail to reach an amicable solution, they may still resolve
their dispute through arbitration, also potentially with cost and time
savings. Parties who choose arbitration are often dissatisfied with the
length of time that commercial arbitration takes, while “in-house counsels
are [also] facing tremendous pressure to economize.”52 In med-arb, the
arbitrator already knows the case, and the parties do not need to educate
another party appointed as the mediator, which would include duplication
of work and delays.53
Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler of the University of Geneva
points out that the ultimate arbitral award often is more acceptable even if

48. Id. at 426.
49. Id.
50. See Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med-Arb’ and the Confluence of
Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China,
18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 164 (2004) (discussing the cultural influence of dispute
resolution mechanisms in China).
51. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration:
Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 4, 490 (2008).
52. Chen, supra note 39, at 423.
53. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 46 (noting the efficiencies of arbitration).
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no settlement is reached.54 Compared to the situation where the parties
commenced arbitration without first attempting mediation, in med-arb, the
mediation process may bring the parties closer together through offers and
counteroffers so that if an issue does proceed to arbitration, the differences
between the positions are often minimal.55 Previous negotiations will also
have served to narrow down the issues that could lead to more predictable
solutions.56 Using med-arb, much of the arbitration process can be made
more efficient.
4.

Building Trust

A powerful argument in favor of med-arb is that following a failed
mediation, the mediators should continue on as the arbitrators if trust is
built up between the parties and the arbitrators whom they have voluntarily
appointed. “If the parties have gained such strong confidence in the
mediator during the course of the mediation that they actually would prefer
to have him or her arbitrate the remaining issues . . . this choice should be
respected.”57 Arbitrators who are effective mediators will be able to gain
the trust of both parties.58 The experience of LACs shows that combining
methods of dispute settlement makes mediation more likely to produce a
settlement than when conducted separately, which could be explained by
the trust built up between the parties and the arbitrators.59
B.

Disadvantages

Disadvantages of med-arb include concerns about the neutrality of the
arbitral tribunal, the enforceability of the award in jurisdictions that are
more skeptical of the legitimacy of med-arb, and the ability of arbitrators to
also be effective mediators. In light of the competition among arbitration
institutions for cases, especially for the BAC, which is financially
independent, the neutrality and competence of arbitrators should be less
and less of a concern. The greatest challenge to med-arb that remains is the
unpredictability of international enforcement, but as med-arb is being

54. Id. at 491.
55. Id. at 488.
56. Id. at 491.
57. Id. at 492.
58. See infra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining why good arbitrators possess
mediation skills).
59. Id. at 491. Wang Shengchang, CIETAC’s Perspective on Arbitration and
Conciliation Concerning China, in New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration
and Beyond, ICCA Congress Series No. 12, 27, 40 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005).
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refined, confidence in Chinese med-arb should grow.
1.

Neutrality

There is always a certain level of discomfort in not knowing exactly
what the arbitrator’s role will be,60 but more practical issues are the lack of
cross-examination, nondisclosure of important information during
mediation, and paternalistic arbitrators. Each issue will be explored in
depth.
There is a risk of breach of due process safeguards if caucusing is used
in the mediation phase, because the information obtained may prejudice the
arbitral tribunal later in arbitration proceedings.61 For example, the
mediator will often ask for each party’s bottom line and this may influence
the final amount awarded if the mediator then becomes the arbitrator.62
Furthermore, if information were revealed to the arbitrator privately during
caucus, the other party would not have had an opportunity for crossexamination. “[T]he arbitrator may have already formed . . . his or her
views as to the merits of each party’s position,” and “[e]ven [if the] [r]ules
expressly exclude[] from the arbitrator’s decision making the information
obtained during the conciliation, in practice the nature of a merged
proceeding makes arbitrator [sic] objectivity difficult.”63 The parties may
misuse the mediation as a way to make arguments to the arbitral tribunal to
get ahead during the arbitration phase, rather than genuinely try to settle
their case during the mediation phase.64 Realistically, caucusing is not the
only situation in which the arbitrator has to disregard information
received.65 There are always cases where improperly submitted documents
or arguments are rejected or discarded after being reviewed by the
arbitrator.66 If judges are trusted to be capable of disregarding inadmissible
evidence, there should be no reason to doubt arbitrators in their ability to
remain impartial despite the information obtained during mediation.67
Moreover, in the US, it is not uncommon for state trial judges to also

60. See Paul E. Mason, The Arbitrator as Mediator, and Mediator as Arbitrator, 28 J.
INT’L ARB. 6, 541, 545 (2011) (comparing and contrasting the roles of arbitrators and
mediators).
61. Thirgood, supra note 22, at 94.
62. This information was obtained by the author through discussion with BAC staff
and observing med-arb during my internship at the BAC.
63. Thirgood, supra note 26, at 94-95.
64. Id.
65. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 46, at 491 (discussing instances where
information is disregarded by the arbitrator).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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mediate the cases over which they preside.68 This process is called a a
judicial settlement and has long been used as a form of ADR.69 Judicial
settlement parallels med-arb, which means med-arb should not seem all
that unfamiliar to US parties.70
If there is the possibility that mediation will fail and the arbitral
tribunal will issue the final award, counsels might be less candid during the
caucusing, which could reduce the chances of a successful mediation.71
However, some argue that even in mediations, as in litigation or arbitration,
counsel is expected to be an advocate for his clients. They may not fully
disclose information that they believe would weaken their position if
revealed. Thus, the criticism that counsel may be less candid in a med-arb
than a pure mediation might not be grounded in reality.
Some argue that independence and impartiality will not be a problem
provided that the arbitral tribunal acts cautiously and certain safeguards are
put in place during the conciliation. While the Arbitration Law is silent on
the subject of ethics and protocols for arbitrators who also act as mediators,
some guidelines and requirements can be found in the Arbitration Rules.72
To maintain its financial independence and to compete with other
institutions, the BAC must attract a large caseload, which means it needs to
uphold the reputation of neutrality and competence of its arbitrators. The
role of a case manager may vary depending on the arbitration institution.
At the BAC, case managers closely monitor the performance of arbitrators,
who will be removed if their performance is not up to the standards
articulated by the BAC.73 For example, 44.7 percent of the arbitrators on
the panel during the first term were not re-appointed in 1998.74 By 2005,
the BAC had undergone three terms of changes and a total of 286
arbitrators had not been reappointed.75 It is likely that retention of
arbitrators will improve as a result of the increasing trainings and

68. See JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES,
http://www.osbar.org/public/legalinfo/1220_JudicialConferences.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2013) (outlining judicial settlement conferences).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 46, at 491 (discussing the dangers of
information that is revealed during mediation being potentially revealed during arbitration).
72. See Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the
People’s Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 627 (2007) (describing some of the
requirements of the Arbitration Rules).
73. See Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case
Study of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313, 333 (2007)
(discussing the arbitration process of the BAC).
74. Id. at 332.
75. Id. at 333.
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examinations required to become a BAC arbitrator.76
These safeguards should be weighed against their chilling effects. In
Hong Kong, if the case does not settle in mediation, the arbitrator has a
duty to disclose as much information as possible obtained during the course
of an ex parte discussion that is material to the arbitral proceedings, for the
other party to consider and comment upon.77 This measure is likely to
prevent parties from revealing information to the arbitrator if they would
not like that information to be revealed to the other party.
There does exist a key safeguard in med-arb: the parties are free to
decide whether or not to use conciliation at all and, after conciliation has
begun, the parties may also elect to discontinue using it.78 The available
statistics on the use of conciliation combined with arbitration in China
suggest that parties frequently decide to use med-arb.79 The parties are
likely drawn to the benefits inherent in combining a negotiated settlement
over which the parties retain control with the process of arbitration.
Nevertheless, there are individual differences between arbitrators
when conducting conciliation and these styles have changed over time. As
one commentator notes, “[b]efore the late 1980s, it was not uncommon for
arbitral tribunals to adopt an evaluative approach, whereby [the arbitrator
while serving as the mediator] proactively informed the parties regarding
their preliminary views on the case in an attempt to persuade them to
consider settling their claims.”80 Since their establishment following the
promulgation of the Arbitration Law in 1994, arbitration institutions such
as the BAC and CIETAC have emphasized the role the arbitrator plays as a
facilitator during conciliation. In line with this more modern emphasis,
arbitrators who are engaged in mediation “are encouraged to exercise
considerable caution and care in discussing their views” of the case in order
to “avoid creating the appearance of bias.”81 Still, arbitrators are given a
good deal of leeway in how they conduct the conciliation. To enhance the
parties’ confidence in the arbitral tribunal, the Arbitration Law and
Arbitration Rules require that the tribunal diligently oversee the progress of
the conciliation and that the tribunal resume the arbitration promptly if the
conciliation does not result in a timely settlement.82
76. Id. at 334 (describing the training that must be completed by BAC arbitrators).
77. Edna Sussman, Med-Arb: an Argument for Favoring Ex Parte Communications in
the Mediation Phase, 7 WORLD ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION REVIEW, no. 2, 2013, at 8.
78. See Russell Thirgood, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT’L ARB.
89, 93 (2000) (noting the optional nature of mediation in China).
79. See Chen at 314 (showing the rapid increase of local arbitration commissions).
80. Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 626 (2007).
81. Id. at 626-27.
82. Id.
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There are also fundamental differences between Chinese and
American conceptions of mediation. For example, proposed settlements by
judges in China can often be more coercive. Judges will achieve settlement
by threatening an unfavorable ruling should the mediation fail. This might
be appropriate for an emerging market like China, where arbitrators who
have expertise in the specific type of commerce can be more paternalistic
to encourage economic efficiency, but most non-Chinese parties will
perceive the judge’s threats as a type of undesirable impartiality.
Because of the differences between mediation and arbitration in China
and elsewhere, the best practices of Western countries have inspired a “reexamination of the values of mediation in China.”83 For example, “[t]o
address the concerns of impartiality of the mediator-turned-arbitrator, the
BAC now allows the parties to request the replacement of an arbitrator on
the ground that the results of the award may be affected by his involvement
in the mediation proceedings.”84 This rule is similar to the IBA rule
requiring “the arbitrator to resign if he or she considers him or herself to
lack objectivity as a result of a failed mediation attempt.”85 Another
notable development is the BAC’s promulgation of separate mediation
rules, which took effect on April 1, 2008.86 These new arbitration and
mediation rules are designed to make med-arb more appealing to a Western
audience.
III. THE ARBITRATOR AND MEDIATOR
It is rare to find individuals who are capable of serving as both a
mediator and an arbitrator. Any person wishing to serve as both a mediator
and an arbitrator will not only need to possess the traits essential to both
roles, but he or she will also need to know how and when to switch
between the two roles. The arbitrator serves as a type of private judge and
must therefore possess a judicial temperament. This person must have the
ability to adjudicate by analyzing opposing arguments concerning the facts
and law.87 “[H]e or she needs to have traits and skills such as strict
neutrality and impartiality, knowledge of the law, ability to evaluate

83. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration:
Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 479, 492 (2008).
84. Id. (emphasis omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Paul E. Mason, The Arbitrator as Mediator, and Mediator as Arbitrator, 28 J.
INT’L ARB. 541, 542 (2011) (comparing and contrasting the roles of arbitrators and
mediators).
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documents and witnesses . . . and decision-making skills.”88 As Professor
Paul Mason notes, an effective mediator needs to gain the trust of both
parties and must “possess a very different set of traits and skills.”89 These
skills include “interpersonal awareness . . . understanding the psychology
of negotiations, finding hidden issues which may underlie the parties’
conflicts . . . and creativ[ely] helping parties fashion a unique solution for
themselves.”90
The BAC, for example, has been able to holistically monitor
arbitrators and ensure that they are qualified as both arbitrators and
mediators. The BAC’s policy in selecting mediators considers the
academic qualifications and previous job titles of arbitrators to be
important, however the BAC is also aware that these factors may not “truly
reflect[] the actual . . . abilities of an arbitrator in handling cases.”91 The
revision of the BAC’s “Standards for Selection, Appointment and ReAppointment of Arbitrators” added the requirement that arbitrators must be
capable of mediation work in addition to their other responsibilities.92
While the BAC is stringent in selecting high caliber talent, it also values
the importance of training and examination of current arbitrators. Those
who do not attend training courses and pass required exams on the
arbitration rules, ethical standards, and arbitration practices will not be
appointed by the Chairman.93 In Fuyong Chen’s study of the BAC, he
notes that “if a previously appointed arbitrator . . . has not handled cases for
a long period of time, the BAC will not re-appoint him [or her].”94 While
some mediation skills can only come from natural personality traits, many
other skills can be taught through training.
VI. ENFORCEABILITY
Parties should consider whether an award or settlement at the end of
med-arb would be enforceable in the jurisdiction in which assets are
located.95
Professor Tai-Heng Cheng has pointed out that “the
enforceability of med-arb outcomes will remain a key issue . . . because
88. Id. at 543.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case Study
of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313, 331 (2007).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 333.
94. Id. at 334.
95. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb (New York Law School,
Research Paper Series No. 34, Sept. 10, 2010), 427 (discussing the influence of culture on
mediation and arbitration).
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structural adjustments to fully accommodate med-arb within the
international legal framework for alternative dispute resolution is unlikely
to occur in the near future.”96 Cheng further argues that “[a]s a policy
matter, to the extent that party autonomy is paramount, party preferences
for med-arb should be accorded legal effect by international and national
legal systems.”97 However, the New York Convention was drafted with
participation from a small number of states, most of which do not favor
med-arb.98 “The difficulties of obtaining consensus on an amendment that
would more fully accommodate med-arb are demonstrated by the pace
through which changes to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration snake through the United Nations year after year.”99
Nevertheless, as med-arb becomes more refined and effective in China,
other countries may become more confident in the benefits of med-arb and
it may become easier to enforce med-arb decisions.
In December of 2011, the High Court of Hong Kong demonstrated its
growing confidence in med-arb when it affirmed an award by the Xian
Arbitration Commission despite alleged misconduct during med-arb.100
This was a notable event because Hong Kong is a different jurisdiction
with its own arbitration laws and it has been skeptical of med-arb in the
past.101 As one commentator noted, “[t]his decision confirms Hong Kong’s
pro-enforcement approach to arbitral awards, and reminds parties . . . that,
whe[n] they believe some irregularity has occurred in the arbitral or medarb process, they must raise the issue promptly.”102 This commentator goes
on to note that, if a party does not raise these issues in a timely manner,
“the party risks being found to have waived its right to object to the award
or to seek to have it set aside.”103 This is comforting to parties who seek
the enforcement of a PRC award in Hong Kong based on arbitration or
mediation that is administered in a way that differs from Hong Kong’s
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Herbert Smith Freehills, ADR Notes, Hong Kong High Court consider the med-arb
procedure (June 8, 2008), available at http://hsf-adrnotes.com/2011/06/08/hong-kongcourts-consider-the-mediation-arbitration-procedure/ (noting the high court’s decision to
affirm the award, while analyzing the lower courts initial decision not to enforce the award).
101. Id. (summarizing the Hong Kong lower court’s reasoning in its initial ruling that
the Chinese med-arb award should not be enforced because the procedures used during the
med-arb made enforcement of the award contrary to public policy).
102. Mun Yeow and Morgana Brady, Hong Kong Enforces PRC ‘Med-Arb’ award,
ALLENS
ARTHUR
ROBINSON,
Feb.
9,
2012,
available
at
http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/asia/foasia10jan12.htm.
103. Id.
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customary practices, i.e., through med-arb.104 It is reasonable to think that
other countries may follow suit if their confidence in med-arb grows.
CONCLUSION
The United States and other foreign parties should understand and
even appreciate the option of med-arb when the forum for a commercial
dispute is a Chinese arbitration institution. As Chinese arbitration
institutions like the BAC refine their practice of med-arb, moving towards
greater independence, impartiality, and competence, med-arb should
become even more attractive. Some even argue that “as Western legal
systems come under increasing attack for being out of touch . . . and for
being stifled by procedural baggage it is necessary to explore alternative
options.”105 With the growth of commercial arbitration in China, arbitrators
abroad may have a way to learn about the advantages of med-arb as an
alternative to cumbersome Western legal procedures.
The advantages of med-arb in China include amicable settlement of
commercial disputes, the ability to better tailor dispute resolution to the
needs of the parties, and more efficient outcomes. In addition to these
advantages, med-arb has a higher likelihood of enforcement in Chinese
courts than mediation alone. And the New York Convention only
recognizes the enforceability of arbitral awards, not mediation agreements.
The disadvantages of med-arb include potentially compromising the
neutrality of the arbitral tribunal, the possibility of a lack of ability to
enforce the award in certain jurisdictions, and the difficulty of finding
candidates who can be effective as both arbitrators and mediators.
The competition among commercial arbitration institutions for cases
in recent years could make the impartiality and competence of arbitrators
less of a problem. The BAC has led the way as a financially independent
and top choice LAC, raising standards and performance continuously. The
greatest challenge to med-arb is the unpredictability of international
enforcement, but, as med-arb improves, confidence in Chinese med-arb
will grow internationally. Other countries like the United States may also
think more about incorporating successful elements of med-arb into their
own laws.106 Of course, greater efforts need to be made to implement the
procedural safeguards necessary to address the disadvantages of med-arb

104. Id.
105. Russell Thirgood, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT’L ARB. 89,
89 (2000).
106. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into
Arbitration: Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 479, 492 (2008) (describing a trend
toward combining elements of multiple arbitration systems from different countries).
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outlined in this paper.107 The exchange of ideas and procedures relating to
arbitration between China and other countries could be used to improve
arbitration in the United States and worldwide.108

107. Id.
108. Id.

